Uncovering Social Network Sybils in the Wild by Yang, Zhi et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
10
6.
53
21
v1
  [
cs
.SI
]  
27
 Ju
n 2
01
1
Uncovering Social Network Sybils in the Wild
Zhi Yang§, Christo Wilson†, Xiao Wang§‡, Tingting Gao‡, Ben Y. Zhao†, and Yafei Dai§
§Computer Science Department, Peking University, Beijing, China
†Computer Science Department, U. C. Santa Barbara, CA, USA
‡Renren Inc.
{yangzhi, wangxiao, dyf}@net.pku.edu.cn, {bowlin, ravenben}@cs.ucsb.edu, tingting.gao@renren-inc.com
ABSTRACT
Sybil accounts are fake identities created to unfairly increase
the power or resources of a single malicious user. Researchers
have long known about the existence of Sybil accounts in
online communities such as file-sharing systems, but have
not been able to perform large scale measurements to detect
them or measure their activities. In this paper, we describe
our efforts to detect, characterize and understand Sybil ac-
count activity in the Renren online social network (OSN).
We use ground truth provided by Renren Inc. to build mea-
surement based Sybil account detectors, and deploy them
on Renren to detect over 100,000 Sybil accounts. We study
these Sybil accounts, as well as an additional 560,000 Sybil
accounts caught by Renren, and analyze their link creation
behavior. Most interestingly, we find that contrary to prior
conjecture, Sybil accounts in OSNs do not form tight-knit
communities. Instead, they integrate into the social graph
just like normal users. Using link creation timestamps, we
verify that the large majority of links between Sybil accounts
are created accidentally, unbeknownst to the attacker. Over-
all, only a very small portion of Sybil accounts are connected
to other Sybils with social links. Our study shows that exist-
ing Sybil defenses are unlikely to succeed in today’s OSNs,
and we must design new techniques to effectively detect and
defend against Sybil attacks.
1. INTRODUCTION
Sybil attacks [4] are one of the most prevalent and practi-
cal attacks against distributed systems. In this attack, a mali-
cious user creates multiple fake identities, known as Sybils,
to unfairly increase their power and influence within a target
community. Distributed systems are ill-equipped to defend
against this attack, since determining a tight mapping be-
tween real users and online identities is an open problem.
To date, researchers have demonstrated the efficacy of Sybil
attacks against P2P systems [9], anonymous communication
networks [1], and sensor networks [12].
Recently, online social networks (OSNs) have also come
under attack from Sybils. Researchers have observed Sybils
forwarding spam and malware on Facebook [5] and Twit-
ter [6], as well as infiltrating social games [11]. Looking
forward, Sybil attacks on OSNs are poised to become in-
creasingly widespread and dangerous as more people come
to rely on OSNs for basic online communication [8, 10] and
as replacements of news outlets [7].
To address the problem of Sybils on OSNs, researchers
have developed algorithms such as SybilGuard [22], Sybil-
Limit [21], SybilInfer [3], and SumUp [15] to perform de-
centralized detection of Sybils on social graphs. These sys-
tems detect Sybils by identifying tightly connected commu-
nities of Sybil nodes [16]. However, to date no large scale
studies have been performed to characterize the behavior of
Sybils on OSNs in the wild. Thus, the assumptions underly-
ing these algorithms remain untested.
In this paper, we describe our efforts to detect, charac-
terize and understand Sybil account activity in Renren, the
largest OSN in China. In Section 2, we use ground truth
data on Sybils provided by Renren Inc. to characterize Sybil
behavior. We identify several behavioral attributes that are
unique to Sybils, and leverage them to build a measurement
based, real-time Sybil detector. Our detector is currently de-
ployed on Renren’s production systems, and between Au-
gust 2010 and February 2011 it led to the identification and
banning of over 100,000 Sybil accounts.
In Section 3 we analyze the graph structural properties of
Sybils on Renren, based on the 100,000 Sybils identified by
our detector, as well as 560,000 more identified by Renren
using prior techniques. Most interestingly, we find that con-
trary to prior conjecture, Sybil accounts in Renren do not
form tight-knit communities: >70% of Sybils do not have
any social edges to other Sybils at all. Instead, attackers use
snowball sampling techniques to identify and send friend re-
quests to popular users, since these users are more likely to
accept requests from strangers. This strategy allows Sybil
accounts to integrate seamlessly into the social graph.
We analyze the remaining 30% of Sybils that are friends
with other Sybils, and discover that 69% (65,000 accounts)
form a single connected component. By analyzing the cre-
ation timestamps of these edges, we determine that this com-
ponent formed accidentally, and not due to coordinated ef-
forts by attackers. We manually analyze several popular
Sybil management tools, and show that large Sybil compo-
nents form naturally due to bias in the snowball sampling
techniques these tools use to locate targets for friending.
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Figure 1: Average friend invitation frequency over two
time scales.
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Figure 2: Ratio of accepted outgoing friend requests.
Our analysis of Sybil behavior and characteristics demon-
strates that existing Sybil defenses are unlikely to succeed
on today’s OSNs. This opens the door for the development
of new techniques to effectively detect and defend against
Sybil attacks.
2. DETECTING SYBILS
In this section, we set the backdrop for our data analysis.
First, we briefly introduce the Renren online social network
and describe the role of Sybil accounts in Renren. Second,
we describe experiments characterizing Sybil accounts on a
verified ground-truth dataset provided by Renren. Finally,
we describe and build a real-time Sybil account detector de-
ployed on Renren, and show how it led to the large Sybil
dataset we analyze in the remainder of the paper.
2.1 The Renren Network and Sybil Accounts
With 120 million users, Renren1 is the largest and oldest
online social network in China, and provides functionality
and features similar to Facebook. Like Facebook, Renren
first started in 2005 as a social network for college students
in China, then saw its user population grow exponentially
once it opened its doors to the non-student population. Like
Facebook, Renren users maintain personal profiles, upload
photos, write diary entries (blogs), and establish bidirec-
tional social links with friends. The most popular type of
user activity is sharing blog entries, which can be forwarded
across multiple social hops much like “retweets” on Twitter.
As its user population has grown, Renren has become an
attractive venue for companies to disseminate information
about their products and activities. Users can become friends
with pages that represent commercial companies such as Dis-
ney and McDonalds, from which users receive real-time news
and updates of events on their home page. This has created
opportunities for Sybil accounts to spam advertisements for
companies, a growing trend observed by the analytics team
at Renren. The increased prevalence of spam on Renren mir-
rors similar findings from Facebook [5] and Twitter [6].
1http://www.renren.com
To effectively attract friends and disseminate advertise-
ments, most Sybil accounts on Renren blend in extremely
well with normal users. They tend to have completely filled
user profiles with realistic background information, coupled
with attractive profile photos of young women or men, mak-
ing their detection quite challenging.
Before this project, Renren had already deployed a suite
of orthogonal techniques to detect Sybil accounts. To im-
prove security for their users, Renren began a collaborative
project with our research team in December 2010 to augment
their detection systems with a systematic, real-time solution.
To support the project, Renren provided full access to user
data and operational logs on their servers, as well as allowing
us to test and deploy research prototypes of Sybil detectors
on their operational network.
2.2 Characterizing Sybil Accounts
Our approach to building a real-time Sybil detector begins
by first identifying features that distinguish Sybil accounts
from normal users. To help, Renren provided us with two
sets of user accounts, containing 1000 Sybil accounts and
1000 non-Sybil accounts, respectively. The Sybil accounts
were previously identified using existing mechanisms. A
volunteer team carefully scrutinized all accounts in both sets
to confirm they were correctly classified by looking over de-
tailed profile data, including uploaded photos, messages sent
and received, email addresses, and shared content (blogs and
web links).
Using this dataset as our ground truth, we searched for be-
havioral attributes that may serve to identify Sybil accounts.
After examining a wide range of attributes, we found four
potential identifiers. We describe them each in turn, and il-
lustrate how they characterize accounts in our ground truth
dataset.
Invitation Frequency. Invitation frequency is the num-
ber of friend requests a user has sent within a fixed time pe-
riod (e.g., an hour). Figure 1 shows the friend invitation fre-
quency of our dataset, averaged over long term (400 hour)
and short term (1 hour) time scales. Since adding friends is
a goal for all Sybil accounts, they are much more aggres-
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Figure 3: Ratio of accepted incoming friend requests.
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Figure 4: CDF of clustering coefficient for users’ 50 first
friends.
sive in sending requests than normal users. There is a clear
separation: accounts sending more than 20 invites per time
interval are Sybils. This result holds true at both long and
short time scales, meaning that invitation frequency can be
used to detect Sybil behavior without significant delays. For
example, a threshold of 40 requests/hour can identify ≈70%
of Sybils with no false positives.
Outgoing Requests Accepted. A second distinguishing
feature is the fraction of outgoing friend requests confirmed
by the recipient. The CDF shown in Figure 2 shows a dis-
tinct difference between Sybils and normal users. In general,
non-Sybil users generally have high accepted ratios with an
average of 79%. On average, however, only 26% of all friend
requests sent by Sybil accounts are accepted. This is unsur-
prising, since normal users typically send invites to people
with whom they have prior relationships, whereas Sybils tar-
get strangers.
Despite prior studies that show users accept requests in-
discriminately [13, 14], our results show that most users can
still effectively identify and decline invitations from Sybil
accounts. The fact that some users still accept requests from
Sybil accounts is explained by two factors. First, most Sybils
target members of the opposite sex by using photos of attrac-
tive young men and women in their profiles. While women
make up 46.5% of the overall Renren user population, they
make up 77.3% of the 1000 Sybil accounts in our dataset.
Second, Sybils typically target popular users with numerous
friends who are more likely to be open or careless about ac-
cepting friend requests from strangers. We further explore
this point in Section 3.4.
Incoming Requests Accepted. Figure 3 plots a CDF
of users by the fraction of incoming friend requests they ac-
cept. The incoming requests accepted by non-Sybil users
are spread across the board. In contrast, Sybil accounts are
nearly uniform in that they accept all incoming friend re-
quests, e.g. 80% of Sybils accepted all friend requests. In
fact, many of the Sybils with <100% accept rate fall into
this category because Renren banned them before they could
respond to all outstanding requests. However, since Sybil ac-
counts receive few friend requests, this mechanism can incur
SVM Predicted Threshold Predicted
Sybil Non-Sybil Sybil Non-Sybil
True Sybil 98.99% 1.01% 98.68% 1.32%Non-Sybil 0.66% 99.34% 0.5% 99.5%
Table 1: Performance of SVM and threshold classifiers.
a significant delay before detecting Sybils.
Clustering Coefficient. The clustering coefficient (cc)
is a common graph metric that measures the mutual connec-
tivity of a user’s friends. Since normal users tend to have
a small number of well-connected social cliques, we expect
them to have much higher cc values than Sybil accounts,
which are likely to befriend users with no mutual friend-
ships. Figure 4 plots the CDF of cc values for each user’s
first 50 friends (sorted by time). As expected, non-Sybil
users have cc values orders of magnitude larger than Sybil
users (average cc values of 0.0386 and 0.0006 respectively).
Since cc can be computed based on invitations only (i.e. user
responses are not required) it can potentially perform well as
a real-time Sybil detection metric.
2.3 Building and Running a Sybil Detector
Our analysis results seem to indicate that a threshold based
scheme can effectively detect most Sybil accounts. Our next
step is to verify this assertion by comparing the efficacy of a
simple threshold detection approach against a more complex
learning algorithm, i.e. a support vector machine.
We apply a support vector machine (SVM) classifier to
our ground truth dataset of 1000 normal users and 1000 Sybils.
We randomly partition the original sample into 5 sub-samples,
4 of which are used for training the classifier, and the last
used to test the classifier. The results in Table 1 show that the
classifier is very accurate, correctly identifying 99% of both
Sybil and non-Sybil accounts. We compare these results to
those of a threshold-based detector: outgoing requests ac-
cepted ratio < 0.5 ∧ frequency < 20 ∧ cc < 0.01. Our
results show that a properly tuned threshold-based detector
can achieve performance similar to the computationally ex-
pensive SVM.
Real-time Sybil Detection. Our analytical results us-
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Figure 6: The size of connected Sybil components.
ing the ground-truth dataset led to the design of an adaptive,
threshold-based Sybil detector that identifies Sybil accounts
in near real-time. The detector monitors all accounts using
a combination of friend-request frequency, outgoing request
acceptance rates, and clustering coefficient. It uses an adap-
tive feedback scheme to dynamically tune threshold param-
eters on the fly2.
After offline testing, Renren deployed our Sybil detection
mechanism in late August 2010, and it has been in contin-
uous operation ever since. From August 2010 to February
2011, Renren administrators used our mechanism to detect
and subsequently ban ∼100,000 Sybil accounts in Renren.
In addition to these accounts, Renren provided us with data
on ∼560,000 accounts that were detected and banned using
prior techniques from 2008 to February 2011. For the re-
mainder of this paper, we will use all of these Sybil accounts
(660,000 in all) to study the behavior of Sybil accounts.
3. SYBIL TOPOLOGY
In this section we analyze the graph topological charac-
teristics of Sybil accounts on Renren. In particular, we are
interested in analyzing whether Sybils in the wild are vul-
nerable to identification using the community-based Sybil
detectors that have been proposed by researchers.
We begin the section with an overview of community-
based Sybil detectors. We describe the algorithms they use
to detect Sybils, and the key assumptions they make about
Sybil behavior that enable them to function. Next, we an-
alyze the degree distribution of Sybil accounts and demon-
strate that, contrary to expectations, the vast majority do not
form social links with other Sybil accounts. Next, we ana-
lyze connected components of Sybils. Temporal analysis of
social links between Sybils indicates that these components
formed randomly by accident, rather than intentionally due
to the actions of an attacker. Finally, we examine popular
tools used to create Sybils on Renren in order to explain how
Sybil components naturally form.
3.1 Sybil Community Detectors
2We omit details of the adaptive scheme for Renren’s security and
confidentiality.
SybilGuard [22], SybilLimit [21], SybilInfer [3], and SumUp [15]
are all algorithms for performing decentralized detection of
Sybil nodes on social graphs. At their core, all of these al-
gorithms are based on two assumptions of Sybil and normal
user behavior:
1. Attackers can create unlimited Sybils and form edges
between them. Edges between Sybils are beneficial
since they make Sybils appear more legitimate to nor-
mal users.
2. The number of edges between Sybils and normal users
will be limited, since normal users are unlikely to ac-
cept friend requests from unknown strangers.
Under these assumptions, Sybils tend to form tight knit
clusters, since the number of edges between Sybils is greater
than the number of edges connecting to normal users. We
refer to edges between Sybils as Sybil edges, while edges
connecting Sybils and normal users are called attack edges.
Sybil detection algorithms identify Sybil clusters by lo-
cating the small number of edge cuts that separate the Sybil
region from the social graph. SybilGuard, SybilLimit, and
SybilInfer all leverage specially engineered random walks
for this purpose, while SumUp uses a max-flow approach.
Although all of these algorithms are implemented differently,
it has been shown that they all generalize to the problem of
detecting communities of Sybil nodes [16].
Although these four algorithms have been shown to work
on synthetic graphs (i.e. real social graphs with Sybil com-
munities artificially injected), to date no studies have demon-
strated their efficacy at detecting Sybils in the wild. In the
following sections, we examine the characteristics of Sybils
on Renren in order to ascertain whether they are amenable
to identification by community-based Sybil detectors.
3.2 Sybil Edges
We begin our analysis of Sybil topology by examining the
degree distribution of Sybil accounts on Renren. Our goal is
to test the most basic assumption of community-based Sybil
detectors: do Sybils in the wild form tight-knit communi-
ties? In order for Sybils to cluster, they must have at least
one edge connecting to another Sybil, otherwise they will be
disconnected.
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Sybils. Each column represents an individual Sybil.
Sybils Sybil Edges Attack Edges Audience
63,541 134,941 9,848,881 6,497,179
631 1153 1,040,745 21,014
68 67 7,761 7,702
51 50 15,349 15,179
37 40 14,431 13,886
Table 2: Statistics for the five largest Sybil components.
Figure 5 shows the degree distribution of all 667,723 Sybil
accounts. When all edges are considered, the degree distri-
bution is unremarkable: it follows the same general trend
that has been observed on numerous other OSNs [19].
However, when we restrict the distribution to only plot
edges between Sybils, we discover an unexpected result: only
20% of Sybils are friends with one or more other Sybils.
This indicates that the vast majority of Sybil nodes do not
demonstrate any sort of clustering behavior with other Sybils.
Rather, most Sybils form only attack edges, and thus totally
integrate into the normal social graph.
3.3 Sybil Communities
We now shift our focus to the minority of Sybils that do
connect to other Sybils. Although we can conclude from
Figure 5 that most Sybils in the wild do not obey the key as-
sumption of community-based Sybil detectors, it is still pos-
sible that the connected minority are vulnerable to commu-
nity detection. Thus, we now seek to answer the following
questions: what are the characteristics of Sybil communities
on Renren, and would community-based Sybil detectors be
able to identify them?
To bootstrap our analysis, we construct a graph consist-
ing solely of Sybils with at least one edge to another Sybil.
The resulting graph is highly fragmented: it consists of 7,094
separate connected components. Figure 6 shows the size dis-
tribution of these Sybil components. As expected, the distri-
bution is heavy tailed: 98% of Sybil components have less
than 10 members. However the vast majority of Sybil ac-
counts belong to a single, large connected component. Ta-
ble 2 lists the details for the five largest Sybil components.
In order for Sybil communities to be identifiable by exist-
ing algorithms, they must form tight knit communities. Put
another way, the number of Sybil edges inside the commu-
nity must be greater than the number of attack edges that
connect to the normal population. However, as shown in
Table 2, this assumption does not hold for the largest Sybil
components on Renren.
Figure 7 shows a scatter plot comparing the number of
Sybil edges and attack edges in each Sybil component on
Renren. All components are above the 45◦ line, meaning
that they have more attack edges than Sybil edges. Thus,
no components meet the requirements for detection using
existing community-based Sybil identification algorithms.
3.4 Sybil Edge Formation
We now examine the processes driving the formation of
Sybil edges on Renren. In particular, we seek to determine
if edges between Sybil nodes are intentionally created by
attackers. If they are, then this means that community de-
tection may still be a viable approach to detecting Sybils on
OSNs. However, if Sybil edges are not created intention-
ally, then this raises a new question: what process drives the
accidental creation of Sybil edges?
Temporal Characteristics. One simple litmus test for
identifying intentional Sybil edge creation is examining the
order in which edges were established. If Sybil edges are
formed intentionally by attackers, then we would expect to
see them created sequentially, before friend requests are sent
out to normal users.
Figure 8 shows the order in which edges were created for
1,000 random Sybils drawn from the largest Sybil compo-
nent on Renren (containing 63,541 Sybils). For each Sybil
i with n edges, we construct the sequence 〈f1, f2, . . . , fn〉,
where fi is an edge, and the sequence is sorted chronologi-
cally by creation time. Each column of the figure shows the
sequence of edge creations for a particular Sybil, with black
dots representing Sybil edges.
As shown in Figure 8, the order of Sybil edge creation is
almost uniformly random. For the most part, Sybil edges
form randomly over the course of each Sybil’s life. This in-
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Figure 9: Degree distribution of the largest Sybil compo-
nent.
Tool Name & URL Platform Cost
Renren Marketing Assistant V1.0 Windows $37http://www.duote.com/soft/30348.html
Renren Super Node Collector V1.0 Windows Contacthttp://www.snstools.com/snstool/86.html Author
Renren Almighty Assistant V5.8 Windows Contacthttp://www.sns78.com/ Author
Table 3: Popular Sybil creation and management tools.
dicates that the vast majority of Sybil edges in the large com-
ponent were formed accidentally: attackers had no intention
to link Sybils together and form a connected component. In-
tentional created connections between Sybils appear as solid
vertical lines in the graph, which are observed for a handful
of accounts in our sample. We highlight those accounts in
Figure 8 by circling them.
Sybil Degree. In order to reinforce the idea that the
vast majority of Sybil edges in the large component are not
intentionally created, we plot the degree distribution of the
large component in Figure 9. 34.5% of Sybils only connect
to 1 other Sybil, and 93.7% connect to ≤10. It is unlikely
that an attacker would expend the effort to link their Sybils
in such a loose way, since these low edge counts are not high
enough to make Sybils appear legitimate to normal users.
Snowball Sampling. At this point we have established
that attackers do not create the vast majority of Sybil edges
intentionally; instead, they appear to occur randomly by ac-
cident. To understand how this happens, we conducted a sur-
vey of three popular software tools used to create and man-
age Sybil accounts on Renren. The details for each tool are
given in Table 3. These tools advertise that they select tar-
gets for friending by performing snowball sampling on the
social graph to locate popular users.
Based on the advertised functionality of these tools, we
can surmise that Sybil edges are created accidentally due
to two factors. First, the goal of Sybils is to accrue many
friends by sending out numerous friend requests. If a Sybil
is successful, it becomes popular by virtue of its large so-
cial degree. Second, the snowball sampling performed by
Sybil management tools is intentionally biased towards lo-
cating popular users. Thus, it is likely that these tools will,
unbeknownst to the attacker, occasionally select Sybil nodes
to send friend requests to. As shown in Figure 3, Sybils al-
most always accept incoming friend requests, hence when
this situation arises a Sybil edge is likely to be created.
4. RELATED WORK
OSN Spam. Recent studies have characterized the grow-
ing OSN spam problem on Facebook [5] and Twitter [6].
These studies rely on offline heuristics to identify spam con-
tent in status updates/tweets, as well as aberrant behavior
that is indicative of spamming. The authors locate millions
of spam messages on each OSN, and use them to analyze
the large scale, coordinated spam campaigns. In contrast,
our study is focused on the graph topological characteristics
of malicious accounts, rather than spam content.
OSN Spam Detection. Various techniques borrowed
from e-mail spam detection have been applied to OSN spam.
Webb et. al. use honeypot accounts on MySpace to trap
spammers who attempt to friend them [18]. Our results in-
dicate that unless social honeypots are engineered to appear
popular, they are unlikely to be targeted by spammers.
Other studies have leveraged Bayesian filters and SVMs to
identify spammers on Twitter [2, 17, 20] and Facebook [14].
These techniques work well on Twitter, since Sybil friending
behavior can be identified using publicly available following
and followed information. However, detection on OSNs like
Facebook and Renren is less successful, since the only pub-
licly available indicators are laggy. Our Sybil detector over-
comes this issue by leveraging friend invitation information
that is only accessible from within Renren.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we make two contributions to the area of
Sybil detection on OSNs. First, we use ground-truth data
about the behavior of Sybils in the wild to create a measurement-
based, real-time Sybil detector. We show that a computation-
ally efficient, threshold-based classifier is sufficient to catch
99% of Sybils, with low false positive and negative rates. We
have deployed our detector on Renren’s production systems,
and to date it has led to the identification and banning of over
100,000 Sybil accounts.
Our second contribution is a first-of-its-kind characteriza-
tion of Sybil graph topology on a major OSN. Using edge
creation information for 660,000 Sybil accounts on Renren,
we show that Sybils in the wild do not obey behavioral as-
sumptions that underlie previous work on decentralized Sybil
detectors. Specifically, we demonstrate that the vast majority
(80%) of Sybils do not connect to other Sybils. Even in cases
where Sybils do form connected components, these clusters
are loose, rather than tightly knit. Temporal analysis indi-
cates that these Sybil edges are formed accidentally, rather
than intentionally by attackers. These findings suggest that
new approaches are needed to perform decentralized detec-
tion of Sybil accounts on OSNs.
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